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Gusta_v Ranis 
Among the most pervasive of post-World War II phenomena has been the 
attempt of the less developed countries (LDC I s) to try to achieve economic 
independence to Supplement political independence. While it is, of course, 
difficult to generalize about the precise nature of this phenomenon, two 
features seem to recur: one, the typical LDC, even if not newly independent, 
has been subject to a set of 11colonia.1" economic relationships as far as her 
previous foreign contacts are concerned; and second, the main instrument for 
development in the post-war has been the attempt by LDC governments to achieve 
a fundamental restructuring of these relationships. In short, in pl.8ce of 
the nineteei:ith ceptury colonial package of private capital, trade, know-how, 
and assured markets, orchestrated largely by commercial interests abroad, 
LDC governments have now interposed themselves and exercise their judgment on 
how aid, trade and technical assistance are best organized and harnessed for 
- .. --·----- ·- - ---national growth and economic independence,, But thip effort has followed two 
very distinct patterns. Immediately 8fter the War and in the first flush of 
independence LDC governments attempted to restructure the colonial pattern by 




~More recently, however, we have been witnessing what might be called 
an agonizing reappraisal among LDC governments as to the effectiveness of the 
instruments brought to bear.. This has led to the attempt at a second re­
structuring, in which the basic objectives of government remain the same but 
the means of achieving them are undergoing substantial changea 
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The main purpose of this paper is to attempt a fuller understanding 
of this two-phased restructuring effort by LDC governments. We proceed by 
first, in Section I, delineating very briefly the nature of the colonial 
heritage., Secondly, in Section II, the'immediate post-war effort by LDC 
governments is described and evaluateda Section III analyzes the general 
out lines of the change in attitudes--and actions-~which has taken place over 
the past five to seven years-•especially in the foreign trade sector4 
Section IV cites some particular country cases in evidence; and Section V 
tries to draw some general conclusions from the evidence presented. 
1 
The 11 typica 111 LDC structure inherited from the pre••war period consists 
of three domestic production sectors: a subsistence agricultural sector 
devoted rna:Lnly to food production, a smaller but often vigorously growing 
agricultural export sector producing minerals or cash crops for the foreign 
market, and a trading cum services sector providing the financial institutions 
and overheads to make the export sector expansion possible and to serve the 
·needs of both the export-oriented entrepreneur and the landed aristocracy., 
The export sector utilizes the reservoir of chea~ labor back in agrictilture 
to exploit specific climate or geology-based raw materials in the form of 
fiber, tropical foods, or minerals. Inputs i.nto this sector include food 
produced in the agricultural hinterland and services produced by the commer­
cialized trade cum services sector. The output of this sector flows entirely 
abroad as part of what has been called the colonial pattern: i.e., the. 
traditional exports which flow abroad are requited by simple consumer goods 
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for the workers being pulled out of the agricultural subsistence sector and 
into the services and export sectors. The profits from this trading pattern, 
to.the extent they .are not repatriated, and as augmented by net capital flows, 
provide for the importation of capital goods which are reinvested in the 
agricultural export sector or in the overheads and services which supp@rt 
that sector ca Increasingly, the role of the foreigner expands from that of 
trader to that of entrepreneur, servicing or actually taking over the direc.. 
tion of activity in the export sector. The service sector no longer ministers 
to the feudal needs of the nobility or the Church but meets the demands of the 
export sector ·for the services of banking, shipping, insurance, warehousing, 
etc. At a later stage this sector will also turn to the construction of 
trade-related social overhead capital (electric power, transportation, housing, 
etc.)o The main involvement of the large and virtually stagnant agricultural 
hinterland in all this is to provide labor and food to the agricultural e;{-
port sector and in return to receive incentive consumer goods (e.g., cloth, kero-
sene, radios) directly from abroad. As long as there is antici-
pation of continuing profitable export opportunities profits are likely to be 
reinvested in the service and/or export sector, To the extent prospects are 
less bright, profits may be repatriated, but in any case little domestic in­
vestment is undertaken which does not bear directly or indirectly on the pro• 
fitability of the traditional_export activity. While in this fashion the 
enclave export sector continues to grow in response to the foreign market, 
the domestic economy experiences little structural change. There is little 
tendency for the generation of a domestically oriented industrial sector, 
little tendency to stimulate major increases in productivity in the domestically~ 
oriented agricultural sector and ·hence little opportunity for growth of these 
two sectors in a mutually reinforcing fashion. 
,;; 
II 
Given these initial conditions, it was clear that post-World War II 
LOC governments would try to put their fingers on the critical flows in the 
colonial resource flow pattern in order 'to insure that the proceeds of the 
traditional agricultural export sales abroad are not automatically rein­
vested for the exclusive benefit"' of that sector and that the domestic indus­
trial sector is given a new order or importance. With little relevant theory 
to fall back upon and with no possibility at all of calling a moratorium on 
the difficult policy choices that clearly had to be made, most less developed 
country governments responded to the common problem in somewhat similar ways. 
They saw the issue basically through (early) Prebish eyes, ioe., with a mix­
ture of concern about unfavorable foreign demand conditions for traditional 
exports and a firm belief in the dynamic learning processes associated with 
the growth of a domestically oriented import substituting modern industrial
i
structure. 
As a consequence they sought ways and means for the governme11t to 
intervene to restructure the flow of resources in behalf of "long-term" 
national development needs and away fr.om the "short-term" privat1: pr9£it 
·seekers, at home and abroad, associated with the colonial pattern. This meant 
first of all, assessing, as best they could, total resource availabilities 
that could be counted on,
. 
from inside as well as outsi<le,--now in the formI 
of government to government aid rather than private conm1ercial investment-­
and, secondly, deploying these as effectively as possible in pursuit of some 
overall set of objectives, e.g., a politically determined minimum growth rate.· 
In this process every LOC government essentially lrns to face up to the same 
problem, i.e., hm, to most effectively organize the human and natural 
reso1rrces, actual and potential, of the particular geographic entity unde·.r 
its control for purposes of growth., In virtually all cases th:ts led to a 
more or less conscious and-more or less formal attempt to plan for economic 
development, ranging on the one extreme from the simple adding up of minis-· 
terial investment budgets to fairly sophisticated 5 year plans complete 1-Jith 
notions of what the private sector should be asked, induced, or coerced to 
do, 
All such efforts, moreover, clearly bear the consensus that the 
government can and should provide social and economic overheads, guarantee 
a minimum of law and order, and establish all the oth,~r major. basic preM 
conditions of development; but there is much less consensus on either the 
ideal division of labor between thE;! public and the pYivate sectors or on how 
to organize the private sector, i.e~, whether to induce it or order it to take 
certain actions considered socially desirable. Clearly many LDC governments 
have strong ideological convictions as to -which industries must be in the 
public sector and there is a ,-,ide area of choice on how to try to affect the 
actions of what is left in private hands. There, in fact, exists a virtually 
continuous spectrum along which the typical· less developed mixed eccmomy can 
try to find a comfortable resting place. Neither the laissez~faire prescripq 
tion of the textbooks, on one extreme, nor government ownership of all the· 
rn€ans of production, on. tl)e other., has proven very relevant iri terms of the 
vast majority of the countries we are concerned with. But there do exist 
very real choices as between the use of direct and indirect controls; 
between tariffs and quantitative restrictions; between the direct allocation 
of credit in the presence of very low interest ratesJ and its allocation as 
a consequence of the interactions in the market for credit; between, ·in 
short., the position of having government policy working through the market 
and government policy trying to displace the mark.et,, 
Most LOC I s faced with that choice in the postMwa:r. opted for a con­
siderable measure of government ownership and/or substantial direct controls 
over the private sectors There is no one sirnpl~ explanation for this 
phenomenon,- but a number of factors can be cited. First of all, there does 
exist a clear interaction between the nature of the proposed colonial re-­
structuring job and the tools considered appropriate for the purpose~ 
Starting from the already described pattern of resource.·flows, the intent, 
broadly speaking was to redirect the proceeds of the tradition~l exports,-­
plus any foreign capital inflows-~into industry and the overheads supporting 
that industryo The tools used were exchange controls to siphon off export 
earnings via the compulsory surrender of foreign exchange and to allocate 
import l.:fcenses to the socially desirable projects in industry. With govern-
ment budgets typically in defici.t and inflation2ry pressures building up, 
increasingly overvalued exchange rates served to subsidize importers and those 
who were operating the new industrial structure, and to penalize agriculture 
and exporters. 
Basic to this twin decision on objectives and instruments was the 
feeling that development could now somehow be "ordered" by the same patriots 
who- had previously succeeded in achieving political cbange. Related to this 
was the fundamental distrust of the competitive system already referred to 
which continues to pervade many of the newly independent countries of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America., All private initiative nnd profit maximization 
are distrusted because they are somehow associated with the wo:ckings of 
colonialism which stood to benefit mainly the export enclave and the mother 
country. Even less developed countries which do not profess to be socialist 
in orientation are nationalist and therefore provide strong support for any 
even ha 1£ way intelligent autarkic policy. Moreover, there is the normal 
identification of industrialization with development. While it is clear that 
successful growth ultimately means industrialization-•in terms of the well 
known pressures of demand as well as in terms of an economy I s improving ski 11 
bas~--the fact that the causation does not necessarily run from industrializa­
tion to successful development was largely ignored•. The basic fact that an 
economy saddled with a large and preponderant agricultural hinl;:.erland must 
somehow devise ways and means of enlisting its support as a fuell:i.ng device 
for the industrialization effort was overlooked. Once there was a commitment 
to controls, coupled with the realization of the difficulty of making decisions 
relating to large numbers of widely dispersed decision-makers in industry or 
agriculture, the. logic a 1. conch1sion was· "to do what was feasible", i.e.. , to 
allocate iesources to the public sector and the large scale private sector
I 
and to down-grade would-be claimants outside of this rather narrow circle. 
Also playing a role was the normal lack of civil service sympathy for and 
understanding of the traditional agricultural sector where household and 
productive units are merged,coupled with the overall feeling that anything 
small-scale, labor intensive or indigenous rightly belongs to the past, and 
that it is the tasl~ of those who build for the future to concentrate on the 
latest, the most modern and the most imitative of western technique and out­
put mixes. 
As a consequence of all this much of the expansion in output took 
place j_n the large-scale industrial sector in accordance with an import sub­
stitution policy in some order of technological comple~dty--although even 
here daring jumps to fairly sophisticated production functi.ons were· often 
·. ~s-
attempJed at an early stageo Rapid rates of industr:i.a lization can, of 
course., be achieved,--and were--but they are likely to be purchased at a 
high price: 
(1) As we have already noted, the system discriminates against tradi·· 
tional exports, since a local producer can acquire more local currency by 
saving a dollar of imports than by· earning a dollar 0£ exports. At the same 
time little incentive eKists for the development of new export industries. 
(2) There results a non-optimal composition of imports for any given 
level of total imports, since imports are allocated on the basis of bureau­
cratic decisions rather than by the marketplace. 
(3) The licensing of imports, moreover, tenqs to lead to excess 
capacity .in the economyo While excess capacity is not a logical concomitant, 
it is in fact ubiquitous because a firm's license for imp_orted raw materials 
is usually linked to its 11 rated11 capacity, which is usu2lly conservatively 
defined. A firm d.oes not, therefore., have the option of expanding output by 
running a second shift; it must expand its plant. 
Normally, bursts of industrial expansion are followed by an inability 
to provide the necessary raw materials· and spare parts, leading to substan­
tial idleness of scarce capital and an ever more highly inefficient produc­
tion structure. 
(4) Import licen&ing leads to large inventories,. While licensing 
gives the government more assurance than does.the·marketplace in controlling, 
the level of total imports, individual firms have less certainty about 
acquiring the amount of imports necessary to achieve th.e most profitable out- · 
put level, since profitability is not given much cqnsideration in the alloca­
tion of licenses. 
(5) The control system absorbs the time of a large group of talented 
people> both those in the government who administer it and those in the 
private sector who respond to it. 
(6) Import licensing may lead to excessively capital-intensive methods 
of production for those firms lucky enough to get import licenses (this is 
in addition to the capital intensity resulting from the pressures on firms 
to expand their plants rather than run extra shifts). This undervaluation 
of imports is coupled with the practice of aid donor to emphasize the im-
port CO!I'.ponent of capital projects and the preferential tariff treatment of 
capital goods. __ 
(7) It is difficult to establish new firms., since a potential pro­
ducer has no historical output as a baiis for receiving licenses. On the other 
hand, giving a new firm assured import licenses is a good way for the govern­
ment to insure its financial success. 
(8) Small firms are discriminated against, since they cannot compete 
with large firms in keeping full-time personnel in the capital to watch and 
influence the allocation of import licenses. 
(9) Agriculture is usually neglected both in terms of the direct atten­
tion paid to it but., more importantly., in terms of the incentives provided by 
the price structure. Ultimately this sector instead of being a major pro-
pelling device turns out to be- a major drag on the economy, since it often 
becomes incapable of even keeping up with population increases,. not to' speak: of 
freeing workers for industrial growth "t-1ithout r'unning into food shortages and pre­
maturely rising wages. As the terms of trade turn against industry., imports 
of food become necessary even in areas which had traditionally been food ex~ 
por'ting. 
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(10) The development process is mainly fuellc~d by the reinvestment 
of industrial profits supple.mented by foreign aid. To the extent that any 
savings are squeezed out of agriculture they are ttansferred to the large­
scale importer and industrialist enjoying substantial growth under hot-
house conditions. 
(11) Finally, to round out this description of the normal landscape, 
5 to 10 years after the big p'ush £or industrialization .has gotten under way, 
you normally encounter a continuing employment lag, i~e., output elasticities 
of industrial employment 0£ around .3, Le., high labor prod~ctivity on a 
very small base abetted by an artificially high propensity to import capital­
int~hsive technology arld" thb ~ neglett of indigenous labor using technolosy, 
resulting from the control structure. 
It is difficult to come up {vith a quantitative measure of the costs 
associated with this system. There e~ists, houeverJ scattered indirect 
evidence on this point. Based on a sample of ten industries, Anne Krue-ge:c 
estimated that import~substitution industries in Turltey used 20-75 lira to 
1save a dollar of imports and export industries8-ll:. lira to earn a dollar. -
In a study of Chile's automobile industry, Johnson estimated that about 
J.2 escudos were needed to save a dollar of imports at a time when the 
officia 1 exchange rate was 3 escudos per dollar. 
2·
- Lewis estimated that 
Pakistani manufactures .(nhich are mainly impo_rt-substitutes) received about 
l1-0 percent more rupees per dollar than agricultural goods (which are mainlyI 





o. Krueger, "Some Economic Costs of Exchange Control:Tµrkish Case", JEE. (October 1%6) J Table 3,. column 5. 
The 
2
Leland J. Johnson, "Problems of Import SubstHution: The ChileanAutomobile Industry11 , Economic Development and Cultural .fj1a_n~ (January 1%7),P• 209. 
3
Stephen R. Lewis, Jro, "Effects of Trade Policy on Domestic RelativePrices: Pakistan, 1951-1965", AER (March 1968), Tc:ble I. 
--11-
Clearly such a system soon begins to have its own life and becomes 
increasingly difficult to abandon. On the one hand} the industrial importing 
interests become more and mor-e entrenched .and used to making large windfall 
profits.. Secondly, not only does the civil service have absolute power under 
such a disequilibrium system., but it is able to substantially supplement its 
income as .:'ll!!2. ~ payments are required to grease the ,vheels of progress. 
Thirdly, the emotional residue of the rejection of the private enterprise­
commercial•colonial package continues in most cases to have a stranglehold 
on the country, and any government will continue· to have to be very careful 
to avoid the accusation that it is about to "give away" the country I s re~ 
sources once again., There also remain the generalized Prebish-type fears 
that participation in the world ecoho!To/ is bound to work to the disadvantage 
of the individual LDC and that it therefore must protect itself via unusual 
methods of insulation and au·tarky. 
Finally, . there exist hone~t concerns about the dissipation of re·· 
sources if the control system were ever .to be dismantled$ Once controls have 
been instituted and new ones added on top of old ones it becomes increasingly 
difficult for governments--even those with the best intentions---to know just·· 
what ,rnul<l happen if parts of the structure are dismantled., There then appear 
real fears of the _deluge_, _with .respect. to..both foreign and domestic re­
-S{lurc-es, .once the gates· ar·e opened to the pressur-e.s. of the market place., 
Even though efficiency may not be at its highest, there is a very strong 
belief that_ only as long as there are direct controls can the government in 
effect be sure it knows the claims on its foreign exchange and_budgetary 
resources and can deal i11ith them effec"tively. 
-12-
In short, arguments for a reversal of the policies of the i1nme·~ 
diate post-war need to be strong enough to overcome substantial resistance. 
Such a reversal does not, in fact., have a chance unless and until the govexn­
ment concerned and those aiding it from abroad--become completely aware of 
the· high cost--in terms of growth foregone--of present po lie ies. 
Such an awareness has made important strides in the less developed 
world during the past half a dozen years or so. Policy makers have been 
forced to note tbat per capita income growth in the LDC's as a whole de­
clined from a rate of 2o5 per cent during 1950-55 to 1.8 per cent in 
41955· 60, ivhile exports declined from a fi.• 2 per cent to a 2. 9 per cent annual 
rate. They have ]?een forced to conclude that the dynamic changes expected 
from a forced draft industrialization program remained on the horizon while 
agriculture languished and unemployment and underemployment mounted. In­
creasingly therefore) two views are now being heard: one, that the 
"cheap 11 import substitution possibilities have now been exhausted and that 
the LDC must turn to e2;port promotion instead; and second, that the pro­
blem of substantially increasing agricultural output must be faced directly 
and soone In other words, the conventional wisdom about .the mainsprings 
of growth is undergoing gradual amendment., and it is recognized that policies 
must be altered accordingly. 
More specifically., the realization has gradually taken hold that 
the first restructuring strategy was substantially in error and, in fact, 
seriously impaired LDC performance, precisely because it failed to set as 
its goal the mobilization of the whole LDC economy. The government must 
still try to tap the colonial flows and reorient them; but there are 
alternative ways of doing so., namely by involving the usually preponderant 
agricultural hinterland and encouraging its mutual" interaction and 11 connected­
ness11 with a more decentralized and rural-oriented industrial sector•
.Facilitating access to resources for -medium and small~scale industrial entre-
preneurs provides not only a chance for more efficient production for the 
domestic market but additionaJ major flexibility for the exploration of new 
export marketso 
In short, there is a growing appreciation that the controlled economy 
syndrome of overvalued exchange rates, import controls and a highly 
differentiated credit market., all geared to favoring public as well as 
large-scale private,, import··substittiting industries., has tended t.o lose for 
the LDC the chance to harness most of its economic agents to the development 
effort. If the scarce energies of offici~ldom can be freed from patching 
up an ever more cumbersome and complicated control system and the undoubtedly 
even more precious private energies from the game of _avoiding or evading 
these same controls., the most vicious of the LDC vicious cycles, that of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy of the "absent entrepreneur" forcing an active 
government to do ever more, can be avoided~ This means that while government 
must remain at center stageJthe large supporting cast which is necessary, 
can no longer be neglected. The first restructuring effort has beeri sub"' 
stantially in error precisely because it failed to set as its goal the 
mobilization of the entire economy~ 
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Perhaps the most remarkable change in the less developed world 
since World War II has been a growing realization of these facts and sub­
sequent attempts to rethink the method by which governments can better 
induce socially desirable actions by the private sector. The ~11 1;ndustrializa­
tion· first strategy has been shown to be costly and inefficient; starving· 
the peasant and the industrial entrepreneur has led to starving the growth 
of the economy as a whole., vJhile the restructuring of the colonial pattern 
remains a major objective,, more and more attention is now being paid not 
only to the improved allocation of the imported resources purchased with 
traditional exports--and supplemented by foreign aid--but also to these 
quaLi_tative aspects involving the incentives and e~1ergies of the economy 1 s 
decision-makers,. public and private. 
Clearly most LDC' s cannot afford a sufficiently large development 
effort to be willing or able to disregard a low quality of effort. This 
sets them off from the Soviets who, incidentally, are also beginning to feel­
the need to trade quantity for quality. The growing realization that success­
ful development may require a different kind of restructuring usually comes 
down to a 'Switch in policies by which the government tries to affect private 
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sector actionso If agriculture and medium and small-scale industry are to 
be mobilized this cannot be done effectively either via direct government 
ownership or direct controls over resource allocation~-if for no other reason 
than the sheer phys:tcal impossibility of reaching the. millions of actors 
concernedo As a consequence, mobilization via policies which work increasingly . 
through the market are gradually coming into vogueo This means that the 
catalytic role of government rather than the direct resources augmentation 
and reallocation role of government--as well as that of its foreign assistance 
supplement--must come into the spotlight. 
That is perhaps the single most important lesson we have learned., 
While all societies share the problem of organizing themselves effectively 
to marshall the resources under their sway for commonly agreed on purposes, 
the less developed countries, in particular, need to broaden the base on which 
productive and innovative activities are carried on; this requires an opening 
up of their systems to a larger volume of decision-making by hitherto neg­
lected or economically disenfranchised segments of the populationc Methods 
somehow have to be found to spread domestic and foreign capital more broadly 
among decision-making units., Such a strategy has to be based in the first 
instance on an understanding ·of -how a given system performs ideally and, 
secondly on what policy changes in each sector--and in terms of the inter­
action among sectors--are required to achieve a better approximation to that 
idea 1~ 
This paper intends to analyze in somewhat greater detail this second 
post-World War II restructuring effort, especially with respect to the for­
eign t1·ade sector. It is well recognized that any liberalization or opening 
up of the whole econorrry to broader participation through the market mechanism 
requires policy changes in a number of linked and inter-related sectors. 
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The market for credit., for example, is closely linked, i.e., complementary 
to the foreign exchange marketo However, while we clearly should not be 
doctrinaire about which particular sector is likely to be "the" bottleneck 
sector in impeding progress, the foreign trade sector is inevitably high on 
the priority list, partly because foreign trade often plays a substantial 
role (up to 25% ·of gross domestic product) and partly., and more importantly, 
because even in the large domestically oriented economies, such as India, 
trade may provide a very important element of residual flexibility for a very 
tightly constrained economic system.. Moreover, it can be said with some 
assurance, that the distortions brought about by misdirected, if well inten-
. .
tioned., government control pol:i.cies, are us:ually most flagrant here and make 
a major contribution to the typical landscape described above .. It is, in 
any case, an empirical fact that real world liberalization efforts in the 
LDC I s have customarily been approached sequentially, sector by sector, with 
foreign trade--the sector which usually 11 pinches 11 the most··-invariably re-
ceiving early attention. -
While the realization that a second restructuring is required to im­
prove performance must be reached by LDC governments themselves, foreign aid· 
can and does help. If aid- donors and at least certa~n segments -of ai1 -aid -re­
cipient's bureaucracy are in agreement on the substance of the argument, 
e.g., that a more br.oadly based participation in-development is necessary,.. 
and specifically., that liberalization of the foreign trade sect.or would be a 
substantial move in that direction, the basis for the required second re­
structuring can more easily be laid. The ability to persuade the rest of the 
decision-making machinery--on both sides••-to make those changes may then 
prove the difference. Just as clearly, imposing a condition on aid without 
such full prior. understanding and agreement on what needs to be done to 
serve the recipient's own development •interests is not only precarious but
I
almost sure to fail., 
/
There are, of course, those who say that even such·· persuasion verses 
on intervention in the recipient country I s internal. affair.so But unwilling­
ness to intervene in behalf of policy changes which are mutually agreed on as 
desirable at the technical level constitutes -intervention on behalf of the 
status quo. It is not in the interest of the taxpayers of either the donor 
or the recipient country to continue to finance a .~evelopment program whose 
effectiveness is so circumscribed that its ultimate success is seriously in• 
doubto 
Foreign aid can play three distinct, if related, roles in this context. 
In the first instance, a certain volume of aid is often required in the political 
sense. to permit a free and open discussion of changes in LDC government policies, 
for example, in the foreign trade sector. Without such an earnest of one's 
intentions to participate in the financing of the overall development program, 
it is difficult· to raise question_s wl.th the recipient on matters of overall 
gover.nment policy. A second use of aid may be in the context of a more 
specific technical assistance or capital projecto For· eJcarnple, an economic 
advisory team to help determine the precise nature of the policy changes 
required_, or the creation of such financial intermediaries as development 
banJ.cs, represent examples of the bringing to bear of resources to address 
specific bot:tlenecks cin a sector-by-sector basis, as necessary to implement 
any agreed-on restructuring strategyo 
In the third instance, aid can serve a very important role in putting 
to rest, or at least allaying, the fears of. those who worry about the resource 
dissipation which might result from a liberalization package. Clearly, the 
v,olume of resources required for this third purpose cloesn' t really have to 'be 
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additive to the aid needed to get a seat at the discussion table; but the 
purposes are somewhat different, i.e., to provide the assurance that if 
there are shortfalls to tariff revenue or if foreign exchange reserves are 
thr.eatened by liberalization, additional aid will be available to serve as a 
shock absorber. These fears may., in fact, be largely psychological since, 
in the textbook sense, the adoption of any pa.rticular policy package, s.:iy a 
shift from quantitative restrictions· to tariffs,· does not have to imply a 
larger volume of :lmports; nor does any particular change in structure have 
to imply a lower tax take., But there clearly exist real problems of timing 
and adjustment and, perhaps even more importantly, of reassurance for those 
who are taki·hg the p0Utical risks inherent in making such changes. 
In this fash:i.on less developed countries have increasingly come to 
trie realization, partly on their own and partly with the help of foreign ex­
perts., that a change in policy towards their .foreign trade sector is . needed 
to improve the quality of their growth performance. The question of what 
particular kind of policy package makes sense in any particular country 
situation, to effect the necessary second restructuring still needs to be 
examined .. 
ill 
In recent years import libere.lization has played an increasingly im-
portant role j_n the attempt to reverse the distortions of past import subs'ti­
tution policies and to reintroduce some (but not all) of the discarded classi­
cal competitive elements into the developing economy. Most often, this is 
linked with movement towan1s a more realistic exchange rate either via a 
~ .it.!!.~ or a de -~ devaluation and (possibly) additional effort .towards 
-J.9~ 
direct export promotion. We will be concerned here mainly with the import 
liberalization phenomenon•-•-though we recognize that the last word has by no 
means been said on the issue of devaluations proceeding from an initial 
d . ·1·b ·isequi 1 rium posi·t·ion. l 
One crucial issuewhich clearly needs to be addressed at an early 
stage is the relevant definition of import liberalization., It is quite clear 
from the sparse literature on-the subject-··mainly confined t'o government re­
ports and foreign aid analyses--that there exists a good deal of confusion 
about the precise meaning of the term. Many less developed countries think 
of import liberalization as simply "more imports". Recognizing that excess 
capacity constitutes a was·te of resource.s--as well as that more planned im.-• 
ports may simply imply more foreign assistance--import liberalization is 
often understood as more "liberal" import quota allocations of raw materials 
and spare parts to come closer to filling existing capacity. Ciearly, 
~, any industry operating substantially below capacity is lil~ely 
I
I 
to be a very high cost industry; the enhanced ability- to bring capacity up to 
more norma 1 levels will reduce unit costs and pC2rmit more of the existing in­
dustrial structure to become an efficient contributor to the economy. It 
should be noted, however, that initial "wrong" decisions 0~1 inc_lust:r:y product 
mb~es and technology are not necessarily solved by more generous current 
import allocations. If import liberalization ~eans nothing more than adding 
more wine to leaky bottles this may not be the most effective way of in-
'
creasing the competitiveness and efficiency of the developing economy. 
1see c. P. Kindleberger, "Liberal Policies vs. Controls in the For-·
eign Trade of Developing Countries", AID Discussion Paper if:lt.f, Office of
Program Coordination, AID, April, 1967, for a beginninz. 
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A second definition of import liberalization goes beyond the mere 
notioJ1 of "more imports" by emphasizing the partial dismantling of import con­
trols either via a broadening of quotas or even permitting all comers to com-
pete for raw material and spare part requirements on an open general license 
(cx;L) basis. In other words, beyond assuring established firms a larger 
volume of raw materials and spare parts they are given more flexibility 
as to -what precisely to procure ·within broad categories., If nex, industries 
and unlicensed importers are permitted to partici.pate, this has addi.tional 
benefits_ in letting the more efficient· industries within the existing indus­
tria 1 complex obtain bottleneck current import requirements, and thus intro­
duces an important competitive pressure into the industrial hothouse. This 
. means that among the (typically) several hundred licensed importers and among 
the existing large scale claimants to industrial licenses, market pressures 
begin to have an increasing 11 bite 11 and the incentives for enhancing efficiency 
begin to make themselves felt. 
This is about as for as mos.t of the developing countries would 
initially like to go& Even if there exists a certain conviction on the merits 
of competitive pressures, it seldom extends to countenai1cing any real threat 
to the eJcisting industrial structure from new investors; thus it is only at 
the final stage that most are willing to permit a ·dismantling of controls with 
respect to capital imports, along with ra,v materials and spare parts. This, 
0
of course, means that we usually do not easily get the desirable access 0 ,:J... 
potential new entrepreneurs who want to "build a better mousetrap". In som'e 
cases, this unwillingness to permit capital goods to be imported on a com­
petitive basis, with all comers large or small, new or old, par_ticipating, 
reflects the civil service's usual notion that II liberalization is fine but 
we. must be in a position to confine it to the. 1 priority I industries".· In 
other words, lip service is paid to the notion of enhancing the scope of the 
market mechanism in allocating resources~, while great care is taken to ensure 
that none of the existing industries is, in fact, hurt. There are many in·• 
stances, as a consequence.., in which the expansion of CGL and free lists is 
accompanied by a growing ban list to provide absolute protection for in­
dustries in which injury can be claimed as a consequence of the importation 
bf a specific type of capital or consumer good. 
In the next sestion we expect to analyze the experience in a number 
of specific aid recipient developing countries which have attempted some im­
port liberalization. 1i7hile there are many LDC I which have experienced de­s 
valuation there are. still only a few even partly documented cases of. full 
devaluation/liberalization packages. One reason for this is the difficulty 
of establishi.ng whether and hmi much liberalization has, in fact, occurrede 
The usual way of nscertainini; ,,Jhether quantitative controls are being more or 
less restrictive is for the investigator to get the 11 £eel11 of the situation 
by talking to businessmen and officials,_ but this approach is not terribly 
objective~ A theoretically preforable way is to measure the discrepancy 
between domestic rr.,nket prices of importables and the c. i •. f. plus tariff price; 
any discrepancy can be attributed to the check on imports imposed by the 
quantitative restrictions. This approach has the obvious difficulty of re­
quiring reliable price data. 
While it would clearly be helpful to have unambiguous criteria foT 
measuring the success or failure of such restructuring efforts in different 
countries, the literature provides little help for assessing an LOC de­
valuation which is accorr.panied by 11 trade liberalization" and/or a large in­
flow of foreign capita 1~ J:n theory such a devaluation might not lead to any 
increase in the general price 
1,? 
level even in the short run for three reasons: 
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(1) the inflow of extra capital will permit a larger volume of imports 
thus offsetting the initial increase in price· and .(2) even if the volume 0£ 
imports does not immediately increase, domestic-prices need not rise if de­
control of imports accompanies the devaluation because the increase in the 
c., i. f., prices of imports simply eliminates some of the importers I monopoly 
profits., (3) The economy will operate more efficiently and so produce more 
goods with a fixed volume of resources; with money supply and velocity con-
1stant, prices may fall~ Besides looking at price changes, another criterion 
might be the extent to which excess capacity is reducedG A third criterion 
is the extent to which exports rise. A fourth might be changes in the saving 
rate as fiscal charges replace quantitative controls on imports and 
incentives for small and medium scale private savings are affected. Kindle-
berger
2 
has suggested tl-1ree preconditions_ for a successful devaluation/ 
liberalization package: (i) an elastic supply of foodstuffs, i.e., a good 
harvest_. - (ii) a~ elastic short-run supply of imported raw materials so thatI 
output--especially of export goods--can rapidly expand, and (iii) a political 
consensus that the pol:i.cy package is a wise one·. This last factor might 
be measured by the change in money ·wage rates follouing adoption of the 
package. 
Even if most people agreed that a devaluation/liberalization would 
make a system economically better off at some ·distant point in the future 
than it would otherwise have been~ it is, of course, also helpful to know 
how long the transition will take and what the immediate consequences ,vi 11' be. 
1
E. Sot1men> "The Effect of Devaluation on the Price Level", QJE
(May 1958), pp. 273-283. 
2
Kindleberger, .QQ• ill• 
The country cases examined were chosen with the hope of illuminating some­
/ 
what the preconditions ior success, the measurerneni of success, and the 
nature of the normal transition to an improved situation. 
IV 
A. Pakistan I 
i 
In Pakistan, imports account for about 12 per cent of GNP and exports I 
ffor about 6 per cent. In 1959 the Government of Pakistan (GOP) began liber­
alizing its import system by allowing exporters (or somebody to whom they t 
sold the export bonus voucher) to import an amount equal to a certain fraction 
of their non-traditional (cotton and jute) export earnings (depending on the 
type of expArt); the Export Bonus Voucher could be used to import any good 
on a specified bonus list. By 1963. imports under this scheme amounted to 
about 7 per cent of total private sector imports (which in turn constituted 
_about 70 per cent of total i_mports). In mid-1960, an additional Open General 
License was intr9duced which allowed newcomers to import for the first time 
and a system of "repeat licensing" was instituted, with import licenses being 
automatically replenished upon proof of utilization of the initial quantities 
(otherwise importers had to ·wait until the next six-montl::.s I licensing period 
began in order to get additional impC1rts). By the end of 1963 imports entering 
under the Open General License accounted for another llr per cent of total pri-
va e imports. 
libera lizede 
- In January 1964 four major iron and steel items were placed on a 
so-called "free list" (i.e., completely unrestricted imports) and another 
50 items were added in July, 1964, By- the end of 1964 such free list items 
t . 1 Thus, 97 1963 about 15 per cent of total imports had been 
1
Philip Thomas, 11 Import Licensing and Import Liberalization in Pakistan, 
A Critical Evaluation" (mimeo, Dec. 1965), p. 78. The clbove description of 
Pakistan's licensing system draws heavily on Thomas I work. 
accounted for 26 per cent of total imports and for the bulk··of imported raw 
materials,. As goods were placed on the free list, relevant tariffs an<l other 
fiscal charges were increased by an average of 13 per cent. 
Hith more than l.;.Q per cent of total :Lmports liberalized in one way 
or another, and foreign assistance levels simultaneously increased by 
substantial amounts, the annual level of import·s almost tripled between 1S59 
and 1%4., As a consequence, the amourit of single sbift capacity in use 
(based on a survey of 65 plants) rose from 53 per cent in the second half 
of 1963 to 76 per cent in the second half of 196l:. and to 82 per cent i.n t}1e 
first quarter of 1965; 
1 
industri2.l production rose by 12 per cent (seasonally 
adjusted>2 from the third quarter of 1963 to the first quarter of 19650 
3 
Perhaps the most notable e2rnmple of the improved resource allocat:ton 
att;ributable to the import liberalization that began in 1S59 was the dramatic 
rise in private tube\•Jell installations in West Paldstane Although unforeseen in 
government pla:ns, . 32,000 such tubewells had been inst<:1lled by 1965. Hhile neces­
sary' purnps are produced domestically, by relatively small engineering firms, 
they use imported pig iron, which was not obtainable in the absence of import 
liberalization. This liberalization coincided with the eovernment I s with-
drawal after 1960 from massive ir,tervention in "the major food crop markets 
permitting prices to rise, and contenting itself with a buffer stock 
stabilization program. With minimum prices guaranteed to producer and price 
ceilings maintained vi.a the :Lnfusion of P. L. 4-80 stocks into the market, 
1
Based on an A.I.D. survey cited in paper by Walter P. Falcon andStephen R., Lewis; Jr., "Economic Policy in Pakistan I s Second Plan", (mimeo,Nov. 1966), p. 13. 
2
All seasonal adjustments in this paper were done by A. I. D. in thesummer of 1967. 
3
The unadjusted increase in industrial production was also 12 per centduring the period. 
the incentives were 11 right" for tubewells to be installed) other crop practices 
to be improved and substantial increases in agricultural productivity to be 
registered. Falcon and Gotsch estimate that ''private tubewells accounted 
for about one-fourth of the total 27 per cent increase in the value of crop 
output" 1 between 1960/61 and 196l}/65. Later on the new 11mirac le" seed 
varieties (Mexlcan wheat and IRRI rice) became more importante As a con­
sequence of all this, foodgrain production which had been growing at 1 per 
cent annually in 1950-60 spurted to 3~ 9 per cent annually during 1 60-65 
with rates near 5 per cent obtained in more recent years. 
Moreover the fillip provided by industries ancillary. to pump pro­
duction_, coupled with the substantial rise in agricultura 1 productivity., re­
sulted in a general mushrooming .of small-scale industry in the Punjab. In 
the small town of Daska, Hest Pakistan,. for example, 11here there had existed 
hardly any machine tool activities in 1961, by mid-1965 there tiere 120
i
machine shops producing diesel engines for tubewell construction. The change, 
in aggregative terms) of Pakistani performance, from negligible per capita 
income increases in the late 50 1 s to increases in the neighborhood of 3 per_ 
cent recently (in spite of drought and war) is quite remarkab1e. _AdmUtedly., 
the Pakistan success cannot be laid simply at the doorstep of liberalization, 
There was the major contribution of liberalizat:{.on in other sectors; 
expecially agriculture, which not only kept inflationary pressures in checkI 
but, for the first time, helped mobilize the agricultural surplus for domestic 
developmento In fact, import liberalization> while important in giving ·the 
¾falter Pa Falcon and Carl H. Gotsch, "Agricultural Development in
Pakistan: Lessons from the Second.-Plan Period" (June 1%6,. mimeo) p. it;.
While other policies made tubewells proHtable, import liberalization madethem possibleo 
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systiem an initial shove., was not sustained long enough to cause a major re­
structuring of the economy. As Mason cone ludes 11 the immediate consequences 
.of the 1964 actions on industrial output in Pakistan were much more the 
res.ult of the increase in the level of commodity imports than of any change 
in their allocationQ Given time., the abandonment of licensing procedures 
would no doubt have brought market forces more effectively into play. As 
events conspired, however., the trade liberalization measures were one of 
1the casualties of the Inda-Pakistan conflict". Nevertheless, once liberali­
zation had started it achieved its own forward ,momentum. E:itports were sub·· 
stantially stimulated; while traditional raw jute and cotton exports rose 
by 21 per cent between 1959 and 1964, exports of non-traditional commodities 
rose by 89 per cent, accounting fqr about 60 per cent of the total by 1964. 
The effects of initial ·liberalization by way of helping to make possible 
the near tripling of the agricultural growth rate and by opentng up new 
windows to farmers via non-agricultural investment opportunities and in­
centive consumer goods cannot easily be overstatedg Once the mutually 
interacting processes had been started the economy I s momentumI has thus far 
proved sufficient to overcome the impact of bad monsoons, war with India 
and curtailment of foreign assistance. 
l'j1
Edward S. Mason, ].co.nomj_s Pe.ve)9,2m~nt_ irl__.Indi~~ 
(Harvard, Center for Int 1 1 Affairs, September, 1966)., p. li-5. 
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Imports account for only about 7 per cent. of Indian GNP and exports 
for about 4 per cent. In June 1966 India devalued its currency by 58 per 
cent (from L}o76 rupees per dollar to 7.50 rupees per dollar). At the sart1e 
time selective tariffs were reduced by varying amounts so that one observer 
estimates that the c.iofo plus tariff rupee price of some imports immediately 
1 
rose by as little as 34 per cento On.the export side the Government of India 
(GOI) accompanied the devaluation with the imposition of export taxes and the 
abolition of all export ::;ubsidies on sorr,e of the traditionnl exports; s~ th;t 
jute manufactures, for example, received a new effective exchange rate only 
16 per cent higher than· the old one. For non-traditional manufactured e,~­
port items, the GOI abolished one kind of export subsidy (import entitlements) 
and.introduced in their stead-~with some delay--three categories of straight 
cash subsidies so that the new effective exchan&e rate increased from 11 per 
cent (for an item that formerly got a 75 per cent import entitlement and now 
has a 10 per cent cash subsidy) to 6L,, per cent (for an item that formerly got 
2 
a 20 per cent import entitlement and now has a 20 per cent cash subsidy)e 
Along with the de jure devaluation, the tariff changes, the imposition 
of export taxes, and changes in the form and amount of export subsidies, the 
Indian Government introduced an import liberalization scheme for 59 industries, 
covering about 70 per cent of the output of the "organized" industrial sector. 
In these 59 industries import licenses were to be issued "freely" for raw 
materials and spare parts a Moreover, six raw materials \}ere placed on "open' 
general license", with no restrictions on the amount that could be imported. 
1
Philip s. Thomas, '.'The 1%6 Devaluation and Import Liberalization 
in India" (December 1966, mimeo), Tab le J,, 
2
Ibi.9.., Table 2o These effective exchange rates do not take into account 
the increase in production costs resulting from the higher ·price of Indian 
imports. For example_, the jute industry ,Jas granted a subsidy on imported 
raw jute following devaluatione 
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This package seems to have had several objectives: (1) to simpl:i.fy the 
previous export subsidy scheme, (2) to simplify-the import control system, 
(3) to raise the Cai. f., plus tariff price of imports and then allow the mar­
ket place an increasing role in determining the composition of certain kinds 
of imports., and (4) to enhance the profitability of e::-~ports vso import- s,ub.. 
stituteso 
Based on a survey of· 140 industries, one study estimated that in 196l} 
Indian industry was running at about 82 per cent of "desirable" output~ 
1 
Bl!,t this average figure is heavily .influenced by textiles., basil:: metals, and 
food and tobacco which account for about 70 per cent of manufacturing value 
added and were operating at over -35 per cent of desirable output in 196L:-o 
Several other industries ,·iere running at much lower levels of "desirable" 
output in 1964: chemicals - l}5%; metal products - L:-6%; electrical machinery -
58%; other machinery - 63%; and transport equipment - 6l}%~ 
2 
Firms suggested 
three principal reasons why they were operating at such low levels of capacity~ 
shortage and poor quality of raw materials, shortage of· imports, and labor 
problems., 
3 
Unfortunately the response of the Indian economy to the devaluation/ 
liberalization package cannot be separated from the exogenous- impact of two 
consecutive bad monsoons~ For eJrnmple, preliininary data suggest that total 
Indian e:;(ports for the twelve months endins August 31, 1967 were 5 per cent 
below exports of the preceding twelv,e months., The entire decline of $76 
million can be accounted for by the drop in exports of "agricultural based" 
1
National Council of Applied Economic Research, Y.!J-9!:L.:JI!:_iliES_iQ.n_ Q.f ·
-1.!l1-ust.EJ.§~~.§l£..Lt..Y (Neu Delhi) 1965), p. 8. "Desirable" is based on a judg­
ment of which industries it would be technically feasible to run two or three
shifts. 
2_lli._<l~, pp. 53~5l:-., 
3
Ibida, pp. tf4-L:-9. 
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commodities (jute goods, teal cotton textiles, oilseeds, cashew nuts, tobacco, 
coffee, sugar, and raw cotton)., The index of manufacturing output was only 
2 per cent above its June 1966 level by June 1967. This failure of manu­
facturing output to respond to the devaluatio.n/liberalization policies is 
again mainly due to the agricultural failure (it should be recalled that 
agriculture accounts for about half of Indian net domestic product). Agri­
cultural failure affected manufacturing both via the supply of raw materials. 
for the textile and food industries and via the provision of the required 
savings, on the one hand., and markets, on the oc.her, for all industries. 
The initial policy changes cited were considered to be part of a 
two-year program by the end of which a 11 quantitative restrictions in­
cluding on capital goods, and excepting only luxuries, were to have been 
removed., None of the remaining steps has as yet been taken. Indeed, in 
the fall of 1966, in partial comp_ensation for doing away with the "indigenous 
angle clearance" system; the so··called ban !:lJ'.: prohibited list of imports was 
expandedo From a fairly stable performance in the ear1y 1960 1s (i.e., 
advances of 3o 5 per cent per yea::::-) the wholesale price index rose by- 17 per 
cent in 1964., 7 per cent in 1965, ll~ per cent in 1966, and another 14 per 
cent in 1967. It is, however, he}.:_:i:'.:·.11 to isolate agricultural prices if 
one is to judge the erfe'ct of the 1966 package. Between June 1966 and June 
1967 wholesale prices rose by 13 per cent, as compared to 18 per cent during 
the 12 monthso While wholesale food prices rose by 26 per cent in this period 
(as compared to only 19 per cent in the preceding twelve months), wholesale 
prices of industrial raw materials rose by only- 2 per cent in the year after 
.devaluation (as compared to 29 per cent in t:he year preceding devaluation). 
The wholesale price index for manufactures rose by ,\ per cent in the year 





devaluation. So it would seem that devaluation--accompanied by partial
\the•
liberalization andYvirtuaL · doubling of commodity aid~-clid not lead to markedly 
higher prices; in fact, given the accident of bad monsoons, it seems likely 
that tbe policy package probably prevented more substantial inflationary 
pressures. It remains to be seen whether the Indian electorate and Indian 
policy-mal:ers will reach the same conclusion or ·whether they will be blinded 
by the acceleration in the level of food prices. The underlying favorable 
structural changes of the 1%6 policy package were thus virtually completely 
"masked" by the happenstance of bad weather. Foodgrain production declined 
from C9 million metric tons in 61-:-/65· to 72 million tons in 65/66. The 
current (1963) ·wheat crop, on the other hand, is expected to be more than 100 
million metric tons, considerably above the historical trendo It seems 
clea_r that "if tbe momentum achieved in agriculture and foreign exchange 
policy can be sustained, and if aid continues a~ least at the levels of the 
recent past then, provided the monsoons return to norraal, near term Indien 
, economic projects are far brighter than indicated by recent performance". 1 
c. ,9..Q].pmb:1& 
Colombian imports amount to roughly 12 per cent of GNP and exports­
to about 10 per cent. In September 1965, Colombia, a multiple exchange rate 
country, devalued the exchange rate relevant for about 7 5 per cent of her 
imports by 50 per cent (from 9 to 13. 5 pesos per doJ.la,:), and agreect to place 
at least half of a 11 imports on an automatic license list within six months ' 
1
Kenneth Kaufman, "Tl'.e Indi.an Economy: Some Recent History andNear Term Prospects" (1'1arch 1%7, mimeo)~ 
"' 
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and 85 per cent of all imports withi.~ 14 monthsc 
1 
In October 1%5 about 
20 per cent of total import licenses covered goods on the free list; by 
September 1966 this had increased to about 80 per _cent of total imports--all 
at the new rate of 13o5 pesos/dollar.. The combination of higher tariff rates 
and the increased peso costs of given ad valorem tariffs (as the import e;:­
change rate depreciated) led to an increase in (nominal) tariffs of over 
~
21 per-cent in 1966. The initially higher nominal exchange rate for "minor 
exports" (everything except coffee and petroleum) did not change._ 
The response of the Colombian rconomy to these new poli~ies coupled 
with generous new aid allocati.ons during this fourteen-month period is not 
unambiguously clear. The monthly level of imports rose from $35 million in 
September 1965 to $71 million in March 1966 (seasonally adjusted) and then 
fluctuated through November 1966 at a level of about $55 million per mont:.-:. 
Total arrivals (seasonally adjusted) were $7i:.3 million in the fourteen months 
after September 1965 as compared to $598 million in the fourteen months before 
September 1965. 
While prices of importables did not increase markedly, the consumer 
(workers•) price index rose by 19 per cent (seasonally adjusted) between 
September 1965 and November 1966, as_ compared to 7 per cent in- t-he preceding--------
14- month.so Food prices rose by 19 per cent (seasonally adjusted) in the· lt} 
months after Septem~er 1965 as compared to l} per- cent in the 14 months pre­
ceding September 19650 The rate of, inflation clearly accelerated in the 
period after the new devaluation/liberalization policies were initiated. 
2 
1
The liberalization percentages used in this section exclude imports
which are financed by foreign credits for specific projects; such ''non­
reimbursable" imports account for about 10--15 per cent of the total impo:rtse 
2
l'he ·wholesale price index ·rose by 17 percent (seasonally adjusted)
in the fourteen months after September 1965 as compared to 10 per cent in
the li:. preceding months .. 
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One major contributing reason was the .J.ag i.n agricultural output, which grew 
by -~ess than 2 per cent in 1%5, as compared to more than 5 per cent in both 
196l, and 19660 This failure to simultaneously stir the agricultura 1 sector 
into forward motion was undoubtedly decisive in rendering the relat:i.vely 
meager results of the policy package that was adopted,, For one thing.., 
devaluation affected the minor exports unfav0rably, iee., they rose by 3 
per cent in 1966, as compared to a 40 per cent increase between 196li- and 
1965., One might have predicted this slow growth.., since the effective ex•~ 
change rate for imports had depJ:eciated substantially while the nominal ex-. 
Change rate for minor exports had remained at ·13., 5 pesos since May 1965. 1 
Secondly, there was a simultaneous effort to change the price relationship 
between agriculture and non-agriculture domesticallyo As a consequence 
with the money supply expanding a·t about the same rate as before (16% over 
ll:. months) prices rose more rapidly and, as one might expect, the aggregative 
performance of real output ·was not significantly stimulated. · Colombia has 
no published industrial producti<;m index. Seasonally adjusted cement pro­
duction declined by l~ per cent in the 11'.} months after September 1965, as 
compared to an increase of 7 per cent in the preceding ll:. months. Seasonally 
adjusted electric power output rose by 13 per cent in the 14 months efter 
September 1965, the same rate as in the preceding ll:. months. Seasonally ad·­
justed steel production was 13 per cent higher in November 1966 than in 
September 19651 which~ in turn Has 11 per cent below the July 196L} levele 
Unemployment in Bogota was 906 per cent in September 1966., as compared to 
1
The average effective exchange rate for impo:tts in all of 1966
depreciated by 29 per cent as compared to all of 1965.,· The average effective
e~whange rate for mi~1or e~{ports appreciated by -6 per cent in all of J.966 as
compared to all of 19650 Urdinoia and Mallon, .Q.2.o ill• 
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9.. 7 per cent in September 1965 and 7.4 per cent in September. 1964. 1 There 
are no data on changes in the rate at wLich capacity was used. One estimate 
is that industrial output grew by about 7 per cent in 1966, as compared to 
5 per cent in 1965. Preliminary data indicate that real GNP grew by about 
6 per cent in 1966, as compared to 3 per cent in 1965. While the evidence 
on aggregative performance is clearly mixed, we can conclude that output may 
have-risen slightly more rapidly after the second restructuring policies were 
initiated. Clearly, however, they were not given a chance to work themselves 
out., In November 1966 negotiations over new loans between Colombia and the 
consultative group of national and international aid agencies broke down, 
2 
and strict controls on all foreign transactions were reimposed. Unlike 
earlier Colombian devaluation, the failure of · coincident· good harvests 
dealt this experiment a serious blow. Or:ly recently are there signs that the 
Colombian government has not concluded that the liberalization medicine was 
inappropriate-~only that foreign doctors were ministering it too publicly-­
from the·· view of domestic political feasibility. 
1a:t~re are no quarterly unemployment data for the country. Thesedata for Bogota are from surveys by the Universidad de las· Andes, as cited inRobert L, Slighton, Urban Unemplovment in Colombia: Measurement. Charac­
_!:_eristics, and Pol_if,Y Problems (RAND, January 1968, RM--5393), p. 16. 
2
Colombia also failed to meet the September 1966 target for ret for­eign exchange reserves that would have allowed. it to draw the final trancl,eof its IMF standby. Almost the entire shortfall from the reserve targetcould be accounted for by a $60 million shortfall from projected ~xportearnings (excluding petroleum), and most of this export shortfall representedlm~er than projected coffee exports. In early 1967 Colombia drew $19 milllonfrom the IMF' s Compensatory Financing Arrangement, as non-petroleum exportsin 1966 were about $12 million less than the weighted average of actual1964-66 exports. This seems to be the case where a shortfall from projectedexports--as distinct from a shortfall from historical exports--adverselyaffected a country's development policiese The IBRD's proposed SupplementaryFinancial Measures is designed to deal with this problem. 
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Ghana represents perhaps the most typica 1 case of an unsuccessful 
attempt at restructuring a colonial flow pattern after independence. With-
out going into all the details of the Nkrumah regime it is clear that there ex­
isted a pronounced tendency here not only for expansion of the public sector, but 
altio for the continuous increase in the extent of direct controls on the 
shrinking private sector,. The goal of the Ghanaian government during the 
1950 1 s can be characteriz~d as a big push for heavy industry with almost 
complete disregard for Ghana I s comparative advantage interna.tionally. Govern­
ment deficit financing forced resources into the hands of the public sector., 
more and more industries were gradually brought under direct government 
ownership and the licensing and control arrangements in the domestic economy 
became more and more pervasive. 




desired results came late and less gradually in Ghana than 
in some other countries. The personal charisma of Nkrumah and his 
efforts to walk the . pan-African stage postponed the day of reckoning until 
1966, in spite of a truly miserable economic performance. At that.time,. 
Ghanaian industry was .operating at roughly 35 per cer,t of capacity; the pro-·· 
ducts of that industry were selling at from 3 to 4 times CIF international 
prices; unernploy.ment wa·s rising rapidly and agricultural output was virtually 
stagnant. ·The excesses of the Nkrumah regime in terms of the creation of an 
unusual array -. of "white elephants" in the field of public monuments,' 
modern factories and the like, pales all other such cases by comparison. 
But while the realiz.gtion of the hi.gh cost of pursuing these policies came 
only graduall~ the new military governrr..ent which took office in February 1966 
.cair.e in, in large part, on the basis of a profound dissatisfacti.cin with the 
economic performance to date. 
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In July 1967 the first substantial changes in policy, which may be 
ca111ed the beginning of the second restructuring in the case of Ghana, were 
put into effect. They coHsisted of a 30 per cent devaluation of the exchange 
rate, an equivalent rise in the producer pr:1-ce offered by the cocoa marketing 
board (to pass on the benefits of devaluation to the producer), and some 
moves in the direction of import liberalization. A very small existing open 
general license category was substantially extended to include most spare 
parts, chemicals., pig iron, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer., and simple tools, 
with the expectation that 15-20 per cent of imports would come in under what: 
amounts to. an automatic replenishment scheme. · The objective of this package 
was ~o reach 55 per cent of one shift industrial capacity by the end of 1967. 
The Ghanaian authorities, moreover, stated their intention to liberalize raw 
materials as we 11, i.e., as soon ·as the foreign exchange r.eserves permitted 
such further liberalization,. There has thus far been no official mention of 
any intended liberalization for capital goods. Moreover., the bulk of 1967 
imports continued to be allocate? under an individual license system, with 
1,100 registered importers making applications on the conventional basis and 
with any new registrants considered in relation to "their prospective ability 
to utilize licenses effectively". 
Clearly this has constituted a small beginning in the right direction.· 
It is equally clear that the period since these initial steps were taken in 
the middle of 1967 is~ too short for any real assessment of consequences at 
this time. Several things can, nevertheless, be observed, even at this biIT~: 
1) the November 1967 post-devaluation consumer price index stood at 6 per 
cent below that of a year earlier. This happy result can be ..in large part 
laid at the doorstep of an exceptionally good maize harvest during calendar 
year 19670 This more than outweighed some fncrease in import prices in the 
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consumer price indexe In spite of some import liberaJ.izati,on, -~imports in 
the second half of calendar 1967 ran at a level. about 20 per cent below that 
of the first half of the year} For the year as a whole, 1967 imports were 
24 per cent below those planned and 16 per cent below 1966 actuals. 
On the export side an additional 20·25 million dollars of annual e:~ports, 
or an increase of 7.lfrper cent, .. is expected; timber exports have already 
increased substantially,. The increase in the cocoa price to producers has 
led to a better care of trees., a decline in smuggling to neighboring countries, 
and an estimated increase in the hurvest of the 1967 crop by 20-25 thousand 
tons., The picture on minor exports is less clear since the benefits of de·• 
valuation may not have been passed on in all cases. On the aggregative 
level GDP in 1967 increased by more than 3 per cent compared to a 1 per cent 
a'!erage earlier, :i.ndicating a net gain in per capita GDP for the first time 
in 4~5 years. It would, nevertheless, be pre~ature to attribute this change 
to the benefits of the new policy package since clearly not enough time has 
as yet elapsed and since unusually good weather conditions leading to a very 
favorable harvest must carry much of the credit .. 
Moreover, it should be very clear that only very small steps have been 
taken to date in the direction of freeing the economy from the shackles of the 
Nkrumah policies. For one thing, close to 75 or 80 per cent of imports still 
remain very tightly controlled and as World Bank observers concluded earlier 
this year "partial evidence i'ndicates that the larger private and -joint state­
private firms have adequate raw material imports and built up inventories · 
approaching 3-4 months' supplyo Most state enterprises have more than adequate 
import materials reflecting both ample licensing allocation and credit. On 
the other hand, many small and medium sized firms still do not have adequate 
ifi!ported raw materials and spare parts and the difficulties in arra-l'lging 
1
There are some special reasons for this, relating to slowness inutilizing available aid. 
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credit undoubtedly play a major part here as well. 11 The import _of 79 
specified commodities "which are considered to be manufacturable locally in 
suffi.cient quantities" is either restricted or completely banned. The 
attitude of a substantial proportion of the bureaucracy continues to be one 
of pro-liberalization but at a very slow pace and with considerable trepida•• 
tions about the excesses of a profit-oriented industrial system. Nonetheless 
substant:Lal beginnings have been made and ·there is talk and some evidence 
that as soon as the authorities feel a little more comfortable about their 
(currently non-existent) foreign exchange reserves further li·beralization 
steps will be taken. There is,, moreover, a realization that complementary 
policies in the domestic agricultural sector can be crucial to the overall 
liberalization efforto Consequently market price.floors for rice and maize 
were announced for the first tlme early t_his year, improving agriculture's 
terms of trade and getting the Government into the business of.supporting 
the private tiade rather than displacing it. The required interaction betweenI 
domestically oriented agriculture and industry on which so much depends 
has thus been facilitated. Whether Ghana has the storage and/ or administra­
tive capacity to run a buffer stock operation must, however, still be tested. 
The main problems facing the Korean economy and those aiding her in 
the nineteen fifties were clearly, to help repair the damages sustained by the 
triple blow administered since 1%5: first the departure of the Japanese.; 
second, the partition of the immediate post-war; and third, the massive 
destruction of the Korean War and its aftermath. What might be called the 
reconstruction period lasted unti 1 approximately 1960 and was characterized 
by a large number of government actions over a large area, mainly intended 
· to get the badly mutilated economy back. on its feet., Inevitc1bJ.y, such actions 
were,
I
often deficient in overall design and somewlv:it emergency oriented,. 
Moreover the attempt to drive resources into the hands of the government 
brought with it inflationary fiscal policies which defeated the prime develop­
mental purposes of the program by impairing the pr:tvate sector I s willingness 
and ability to save and invest. J.n fact, throughout the late 50 1 s and even 
in the early 60 1 s Korea was racked by substantial inflation in spite of a 
number of major stabilization efforts assisted by the United States. As long 
as these efforts were unsuccessful there was little chance to restore a sensq 
of predictability to economic relationships an<l'to begin to unloosen those 
forces in the private sector without whose contribution development in the 
mixed economy is very difficult. 'those· relatively fine allocative decisions 
which yield better developmental performance cannot be expected to be made by 
individual decision-makers unless there is some likelihood that contractual 
obligations will not be swamped by inflation and entrepreneurial energies_ 
will not be diverted into the circumvention of direct controls and the search 
for a quick financial return. 
By 1963 the back of this self-feeding inflationary spiral was finally 
broken and the Government of Korea began to turn its attention to the need 
for a possible second restructuring of the kind we have previously described., 
Like others, it determined to first deal with the. foreign exchange market 
before turning to reform 'in the complementary financial market. Exports 
amount to about 12 per cent and imports to about 22 per cent of GNP. In 
May 1964, Korea devalued by 29 to 96 per cent
1 
and unified its various 
1rt is difficult to say exactly how much devaluation occurred because
Korea had a multiple exchange rate system, rang(ng from 130 won per dollar to
190 won per dollar. The new rate was set at 255 won per dollar .. 
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multiple exchange rates and introduced what was supposed to be a floating 
exchange rate. This floating rate fluctuated between 257 won per dollar in 
May 196t., and 271 -won per dollar in early 1965. Since then it has fluctuated 
between 274 and 267 won. 
Along with this devaluation, the Korean Government gradually 
liberalized its import control system through· a widening of import quotas 
and the iritroduction of a partial export retention scheme. In August 1964 
a quasi-automatic licensing system was introduced, with which an importer 
could get automatic approval of import licenses equal in value to 20 per cent 
of his export earnings! sales to UN forces in Korea, and g·ol_d sales to the 
Bank of Korea·. In November 1964 this was increased to 25 per cent. Further 
liberalization took place in 1965 with an automatic approval system for ll:.95 
items, discretionary lice11ses for 13D items, and a prohibited list covering 
620 items. This meant that almost 75 per cen~ of non-u.s. aid imports were 
now on an automatic approval basis. 1 . This liberalization trend has continued 
steadily until.1 by the first half of 1967, 2, 98li- items are on the automatic 
approval list, 142 items are on the discretionary licensing list and only 
362 items are on the prohibited or ban list. Almost 90 per cent of all im­
ports other than those financed by U.S. aid are now admitted on an automatic 
replenishment basiso 
2 
Thus, for all practical purposes, quantitative re­
strictions no longer play an important role in.determing the structure of 
Korean imports. 
After adoption of the first substantive restructuring package the· 
wholesale price index of imported goods rose by 29 per cent between May 1%4 
1
Exchange Restrict:i,i)f!.§,, Seventeenth Annual Report (HJF, 1966), P• 335.U.S. aid fina,1ced 30 per cent of Korean imports in 196f:.• 
2
1£.:1.!;!., 1967, P• 374. 
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and January 1965 and then remained almost constanto But this price increase 
was not passed on to other commodities. The t·otal wholesale price index rose 
by only 2 per cent between Nay 196li- and January 1%5; in the twelve months 
after devaluation wholesale prices rose by only 5 per cent, as compa1:ed to 
52 per cent in the year preceding devaluation., This overall stability in 
wholesale prices was due in large part to improved agricultural performance 
permitting a decline in wholesale grain prices (by 24 per cent between May 
196L~ and May 1965, as compared to an increase of 77 per cent between May 1963 
and May 1964). 
1 
Agricultural output (in constant 1960 prices~ in fact, rose 
by 18 per cent in 196L~ compared to 6 per cent in 1963. 
The simultaneous unific·ation of domestic interest rates at higher, 
and more realistic,· 1evels provided for the first time incentives for domestic 
saving and production. The change in overall performance of the Korean 
economy has been little short of spectacular, From negative saving rates in 
the 1958-62 period) and at 5.8 per cent as late as 1962-64, Korea is nou ex­
periencing saving rates in excess of 13 and 14 per cent. Manufacturing-out-
put rose by 24 per cent in the 12 months after devaluation, as compared to 
an 8 per cent increase over the preceding 12 months. Exports also responded 
extremely well to the devaluation/liberalization package growing at a 29 per 
cent rate during 62-66., compared to 15 per cent in 58-62. In more recent years 
exports have growl:} at close to L,O per cent. Overall) per capita income 
growth has risen from 1 1/2 per cant for the 19'58-62 period to 6- 2 per cent 
in the 1962-66 period and in excess of that level in 1967. 
1
This same price pattern occurred in the consumer price index. The· 
Seoul consumer price index for grains fell by 18 per cent beti,een May 196L:. 
and May 1965, while the total consumer price index rose by only 8 per cent 
during the 12 months. In the twelve months prior to devaluation it had risen 
by lf7 per cent, with grain prices rising by 96 per cent. 
The above admittedly rather cursory rev:i.ew of a number of liberaliza­
tion efforts--over an.admittedly rather too short period of time-- does not 
lend itself to grand generalizations. Korea, India and Ghana had substantial 
~
de jure devaluations coupled with gradual import liberalizations-~more e,r-
. tensive in the case of Korea and -India than Ghana. Colombia had a large de·· 
valuation of the import rate coupled with rapid liberaJ.izat:ion-;' and Pakistan 
gradually devalued, - de facto via the export bonus s·cheme) accompanied by sub~ 
stantial import liberalization. None of the exgeriments have run long 
enough to permit great confidence to be attached to any conclusions that 
might be reached. Some of the experiments, e.g., Colombia and Pakistan} \·Jere, 
moreover, interrupte_d by political <;:risis or war; others suffered from the 
overwhelming effect of exogenous shocks ,,1hich swept all before it, e.g., 
India. Nevertheless we may be perm_itted a few tentative observations on 
the nature of the second restructuring to date and the directions it is l:.Ucely 
to take in the future. 
Even at this early stage there is evidence of th~ possibilities of 
fundamental changes in economic performance•. If we take the Pakistan and 
Korean examples which have had the benefit of at least several years of 
application and where liberalization did encompass capita 1 goods, as well 
~ 
as raw materials and spare 
' 
parts, we can note a real turn-about in performance, 
whether measured·· in terms of per capita income growth, saving behavior or 
export performance. How much of this is due to the higher import levels 
made possible and how much due to the restructuring of imports itself is, 
hmvever, more difficult to docurii'ent. Trie real test of this would be an 
examination of changes in the industrial production structure as well ·as 
between industry and other sectors. In the short-term, changes in the pattern 
of investment allocation at the mm;gin might have to serve as a proxy. 
But neither of these two exercises has as yet been carried through due to 
problems with data availahility .• 
The extent of "openness" of the economy must be of considerable 
relevance in terms of the potential for good--or evil- ... of any devaluation/ 
liberalization package. fil~.!~.P~~ the· linkages between the foreign 
trade sector in a· succesaful case like Korea I s and the rest of the econor,ry 
must have much greater potential than in India where the trade tail can't 
be e)rpected to 11 wag11 the development dog. 
Secondly, complementary policy changes, especia1ly in the agricultural. sec-
tor and in.credit markets, may be of the utmost importance. In the more 
successful cases under scrutiny, eag., Korea and Pakistan, harvests were 
-good and agricultural productivity was increasing substantially both . wliile 
and immediately after the ne\~ policies were _adopted. This is essential 
if the eroding effects of inflation are to be held off and if there is to 
be time for the restructuring process to gather steam. Complementary changes-­
with devaluation--on the export side, i.e.) the levying of export duties for tra-
ditional commodities facing an i.nelastic foreign demand~ and the installation 
of a supplementary direct export promotion machinery, including subsidies, 
have been charecteristic in the attempt to accelerate the usually 
somewhat slower response on the export side •. 
Thirdly, there can ·-::,e little doubt concerning the importance of 
additiona 1 foreign exchange avai labi J.ities for the immediate post-restructuring 
periodo At a time when private sector confidence still hangs precariously 
in the balance, there is little as important as the show of resoluteness and 
co:i.sistency in carrying through •with a phased liberalization program. 
Nothing can be as damaging at a time like that than hesitation, or a tem­
porary return to restrictionism, none of which is conducive to eliminating 
a full-throated response from the previously disenfranchised economic 
sector~,whose participation is so essential to final success. Where foreign 
exchange reserves are low, e.g., Ghana, or the confidence on future aid 
flows is missing, e~g., Colombia., the private sector is likely to adopt a 
wait and wee policy-~proving the skeptics right once again. But the addi... 
tional aid flows are also directly relevant to the ability to contain the in-­
evitable inflationary pressures which ensue in the wake of such a policy 
shift. If the higher price of .imports a$sociated with the devaluation, 
especially of industrial raw materials and other imports, is not at least 
partially offset by the dismantling of controls and the larger volume of 
imports now made possible, the impact on consumer price indeces with all 
its consequences ~ould have been virtually unavoidable. 
j 
Finally., it should be clear that our concentration on the dismantling 
of quantitative controls as part of the restructuring effort gives us only 
a partial or beginning representation of reality. As is well known, the 
typical less developed economy disequilibrium system can also be maintained 
by tariff and/or tax/subsidy packages. Ideally., in fact., we should measure 
the total extent of protection by calculating ~he effective tariff on various 
industries, including specific tafes, import surcharges and deposit re• 
quirements and., in the garden variety of cases in which QR I s are dominant.,, 
using the resulting imp licit tariffs (i.e., the percentage difference between 
domestic and c. i. fe world prices) as the equivalent of the nominal tariff 
structure. It is, howev.er, true, in terms of a sequential liberalization 
e,ffort, that it is the import licensing system which carries the effective 
11 bite 11 in most real world cases. Once this 11 bite 11 is removed, tariffs usually 
become relevant, especially if some of them have beei1 raised in the course 
of the earlier dismantling of the quantitative restrictions., Not infrequently 
the tariff pattern that emerges as binding and relevan11 itself shows no really 
discernable logical pattern or scientific basis. A policy of high tariffs on 
finished googs and lmv or non-existent tariffs on intermediate goods has 
usually lead to a very high level of effective protection for domestfc pro­
ducers, which policy, while working through the mark.et mechanism, is still 
substantially distorting and blunting of the competitive pressures which the 
polic.y makers apparently now want to admit. ·Tariff rationalization is 
therefore likely to provide the next--and hopefully final challenge--to 
those who wish to restructure the system along more efficient lines. 
As we look into the futu:ce this will undoubtedly require the evolution 
of a country-specific tariff policy following the dismantling of quantitative 
restrictions, from which we might then deviate when necessary. In this 
connection the confusion between infant industry and revenue objectives of 
tariffs must: 'be eliminated. In sequential termsJ a move toward a uniform 
tariff rate, perhaps somewhat lower on raw materials and machinery than on 
finished goods, and the substitution of excises for tariffs in the luxury 
good category1 may be sensible, This uniform tariff can then over time be 
lowered very much in the manner of a gradual withdrawal of temporary preferences. 
Deviations from- uniformity a long the vJay would have to be defended in terms 
~
of a convincing infant industry argument and protective tariffs set in 
relation to some objective criterion such as domestic value added at world' 
prices. 
2 
But this takes us beyond the boundaries of the present paper. 
1
See R. McKinnon, Tariff and Commodity.Tax Reform in Korea 0 mimeo,July, 19-67. 
2
This suggestion :i.s made by R. McKinnon, .QR• cit. 
